WHAT IS HAPPENING IN COLOMBIA? (CONTEXT)
After six weeks of national strike, where violence has taken the streets in some cities, Colombia does not find the exit to this crisis. Here is the first part of an analysis about the origin of this crisis, what is the context, and why the country has facing this kind of social unrest.
I divided the analysis in two parts: This one, where you can find the context in which the protest arose and where I want to explain the reasons behind the crisis; and another blog post where I do a chronicle of the crisis and where the reader will find the development of the crisis until today.
The Facts.
Since May 28th 2021 to today Colombia has been facing a series of strikes and protest in its main cities led by the unions, the indigenous peoples, and mainly, by the young. Each group advocates for its own interest, but job opportunities, free public education and enhancing quality of life, have been the axis of the demands.
Some strikes have become in violent protests in many places and municipalities around the country due to a different kind of reasons and contexts. The government states that the strikes and the violence are caused by organized crime groups, while the students and other actors like Human Rights Watch, have said that police, particularly the Special Riot Police -Esmad-, has deployed excessive force against the people on the streets which has led the mob to respond with violence.
In the last two weeks there have been groups of citizens that have blocked highways, roads and even ports as part of the protest; that have been caused food and goods shortages mainly in the southwest of the country, generating another source of tension between the strike’s organizers and the national government.
Despite 2 weeks ago Ivan Duque’s government started a conversation with some of the strike’s leaders, it seems that neither of the sides is willing to yield for political reasons. The police have been accused of Human Rights violation whereas the protestors have been treated by the government as an extension of the organized crime groups in some cities. Whilst the government points out that there is a political interest behind the protest (one year from the presidential elections); the unions, the indigenous peoples and the young demand such number of solutions that the government, any government, is not able to comply.
In the mist of the allegations from side to side, there is a lot of confusion about the reasons behind this crisis. To understand why this social unrest has become one of the biggest challenges the country has faced in the last 20 years it is possible to mention four main factors: political polarization, the emergence of a new generation, the inequality of the system, and a government that lacks leadership and governability.
Political polarization.
Since 2016 when the government of Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) signed the peace agreement with the Farc, the biggest and oldest guerrilla group in the Americas, the country has seen the emergence of two opposite political factions: those who back the peace agreement, and the others that are against it.
Those against think that the agreement was a betrayal from Santos because the president was a kind of an heir of the political establishment whose main representative is former president Alvaro Uribe. For Uribe, Farc was a terrorist and a drug-traffiking group that should be treated as criminals not as a political actor; so the Santos agreement was catalogued by Uribe, and by the right-wing political establishment, as a surrender of the Colombian state before its oldest enemy and also as a symbol of treason by former president Santos.
Uribe, his political party, the Democratic Center, and his allies not only tried to prevent the agreement to be sign, but also linked their political endeavor like a fight against ‘socialism’, against ‘communism’, and even as a defense of the family and the Christian values.
On the opposite, those who support the peace agreement thought that it was the most important tool to leave 50 years of violence behind, mainly in rural and poor towns; and the best opportunity Colombia has had to see the future beyond the dichotomy between war and development.
Despite all the attacks, and thanks to the international community pressure, to those in favor of the agreement in the Congress and to the Santos government will, the accord was finally enacted on September 26th 2016.
Pitifully, the political struggle between Uribe and Santos left a deep political division and a tense social environment that sowed two extreme and opposite perspectives: a right-wing, conservative and traditional one, represented by former president Uribe; and another left-wing, progressist and anti-establishment one, represented by senator Gustavo Petro. Like in United States, where Donald Trump divided politics in two apparently irreconcilable positions; in Colombia conservatives and progressists are living in a tough and permanent confrontation that permeate every space of society.
The strike and the riots Colombia has suffered in the last four weeks are an extension of the polarization: by one hand there is a weak and lost government with a conservative and traditional vision of social tension, trying to tackle the legit protest with police violence and the criminal law; and by the other hand, the protestors; an amorphous mass of demands, claims, feelings, frustrations, and hopes that, unintentionally, could be serving the political purpose of the extreme left-wing against the government.
The New Generation
Those who were born in the mid 90’s and early 2000’s and represents the 21,8% of the population, did not experience the violence from drug-trafficking and the guerrillas, which marked the baby-boomers and the X generation in Colombia until today. While people in the 70, 80 and 90’s lived in a country beaten by the Cold War guerrillas and by the War on Drugs, millennials and centennials face different challenges; mostly those of the new millennium: education and job opportunities, technology, social networks, global warming and climate change.
The mayor of Bogotá, Claudia López (2019-2023), pointed out that those in the protests are mostly young people between the ages of 16 and 28 who neither study nor work. The ‘ni-nis’ some call them. The young as a segment of the population have some reasons to protest. According to the government statistics department -Dane- by January 2021 the youth unemployment rate was 23.5% and the youth unemployment among women was 31.6% compared to figures from the end of 2020. These numbers can become even more dramatic if we take into account that of the entire employed population, 48.9%, work informally. That means that almost half of the working-age population get their income selling edibles on the streets, carrying packages in market places, selling toys or household goods on the sidewalks, and developing any informal activity that allows them to get some money for basic goods and services. Pension? Health care? College? Savings? Vacation? Forget about it!
So, it is possible to argue that for people between 18 and 28 the old political speech on the War on Drugs, or against communism and socialism does not meet their expectations much less their hopes. Much less when in an interconnected world they already know that the Americans have legalized recreational marijuana in several states, and that communism and socialism (in their classic definition) are just pages in history books. In addition, the pandemic restrictions and the lockdowns brought other pressures to the young’s circumstances making even more evident this population disadvantages.
Affordable school loans, job opportunities, better health services and free public education for everybody are the main things the young have been claim from the beginning of the protests, before a government that won the election with the youngest candidate in history, a 42 years old guy that introduced himself as a new generation politician that wanted to represent the young and get rid of the corruption and the clientelism of the traditional and old politicians. Well, according to the young on the strikes the president has not kept his promise.
The inequality of the system.
According to the World Bank Colombia is a middle-income country with a GDP nominal per capita of $5,752 and a GDP (PPP) per capita of $16,264. Just to give some perspective, United States ranked 1st in the world and has a GDP nominal and PPP per capita of $68.309.
Colombia is the 83rd country in the Human Development Index above Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay in the region, and above China in the world that ranks in position 85. Colombia exports oil, coal, coffee, bananas, gold and flowers. It is one of the richest countries by its environment. In fact, it is known to be the 2nd country in the world by its biodiversity and It is also the 2nd country in the planet by its water resources. In general, Colombia is not considered a poor country because it has a big economic potential regarding its natural resources and its geographical characteristics.
However, Colombia’s greatest economic challenge is inequality. Colombia is the second-most unequal country in Latin America after Honduras and according to the World Bank is one of the tenth most inequal countries in the world with a Gini coefficient of 0.513. In 2019 the economic site Statista estimated that 56.2% of the income generated in Colombia was held by the richest 20% of its population. Another analysis made by James A. Robinson: “The Misery in Colombia” (2015), stated that 45% of the national income accrues to the richest 10% of the population; and that 14% of landowners hold 80% of the land in the country.
Another way to understand inequality from the wealth distribution perspective is through the time Colombians need to climb the economic differences. According to Minouche Shakif author of the Princeton University study “What we owe each other” (2021), a family belonging to the low-income share of the population in Colombia need 11 generations to become a middle-income family. 11 generations! The equivalent of 275 years! Just to compare, in Denmark families need 2 generations, in United States 5, in Chile 6 and in Brazil 9.
All the figures above just try to explain that despite Colombia has an enormous economic potential, it is ordinary that people in Colombia think that the system works only for those in the peak of the pyramid. By ‘the system’ I mean the interactions between the government, the judiciary, the Congress, the financial sector, the education, the political parties, the society, the private sector, the State and all the public services, just to name the main components.
If you were born within the most-richest 20% you will have enough opportunities to thrive. It is possible to say that privilege is hereditary, even if you are not an exemplary citizen, not only because you can pay for it but also because corruption will allow you to achieve everything you want. Military service is a great example. Military service is mandatory for all males finishing high school or those above 18 years old. Military service in a country that has maintained a steady armed conflict with the guerrillas in rural areas for almost 50 years it is not desirable. So, rarely males of the most expensive schools in the country serve in the military whereas almost all males of the low-income schools and neighborhoods do. That happens because high-income families usually bribe members of the military to avoid the mandatory service.
Another example comes from the financial sector. It is almost impossible that banks approve loans to low-income families because most of them have no collateral to offer. So, loans that serve as a leverage to thrive, do not exist for most people in Colombia. Paradoxically, while informal moneylenders take banks place, acting like little mafia, collecting money by cohesive methods and violence; banks and their financial branches work with public resources that governments have given to them through legal figures as managers of the retirement pensions or by rescue programs like the government granted amid the pandemic.
Those are just a couple of phenomena that describe Colombia as one of the most inequal countries in the world, but what I want to point out is that for many, many years Colombians have endured the inequality and the system malfunction till now. The economic impact of pandemic and the lockdowns seem to be the straw that broke the Camel’s back, and the spark that lit up people’s indignation against the political class and against the lack of leadership this government has shown.
A weak government with borrowed governability
As I described in this previous analysis, one of the president’s main weakness has been the lack of political authority, all derived from his notorious inexperience. Ivan Duque (44), who was professionally formed in a middle-high positions at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington D.C, where he lived for 14 years; won the presidency thanks to his mentor and former president, Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010). Uribe chose Duque to be the candidate of the right-wing party, the Democratic Center, after his protege served as a Senator for less than 4 years. Mr. Duque who served in Congress also thanks to Uribe’s votes, had not had a previous electoral experience till he became president.
Without a broad political experience and the absence of a long public career; the political authority of Ivan Duque comes from his relationship with former president Alvaro Uribe, the most important leader of the establishment in Colombia and one of the most popular politicians in the country, at least untill 2018 when his favorability started to fall due to criminal investigations and public opinion changes.
The lack of political networks, and even a political team, has made Mr. Duque to shape his government circle around his five or six closest friends in Colombia and around the most influential politicians of Uribe’s party. In some way, Mr. Duque’s government is conformed by people that he barely knew, and by officials that have no political commitment to the president directly. Before the president’s lack of closeness and confidence with the main government members and the Congress, he sheltering in his two or three closest advisers that, incidentally, are more inexperienced than the president.
Without a recognizable political authority among politicians and even colleagues, Duque have not exercised leadership like a President but like another Minister or like an adviser with some institutional influence among the senior government team. In the same way, the president has borrowed his governability from the relationship between Alvaro Uribe and the political parties; relationship that Uribe built as president and more recently as senator; position that Uribe held until his resignation on August 2020 due to criminal investigation.
With those characteristics, the president has faced 3 major strikes in his 3 years in office, that have hitting not only the government’s favorability, but also its ability to govern. Therefore the government’s dreadful crisis management have deepened the president’s ability to fulfill the expectations he created about his government.